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“The University of Winnemac...is not a snobbish rich-man’s col-
lege, devoted to leisurely nonsense. It is the property of the people 
of the state, and what they want — or what they are told they 
want — is a mill to turn out men and women who will lead moral 
lives, play bridge, drive good cars, be enterprising in business, and 
occasionally mention books, although they are not expected to have 
time to read them. It is a Ford Motor Factory, and if its products 
rattle a little, they are beautifully standardized, with perfectly inter- 
changeable parts… by 1950, one may expect it to have created an 
entirely new world-civilization, a civilization larger and brisker and 
purer.” (Lewis, 1925, p. 11)
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties. It takes 
a meeting of the minds and mutual concurrence on terms before a 
“contract” exists in legal terms. Higher education and the society — 
in this case American — that supports colleges and universities have 
successively modified the agreements under which they have ex-
changed value - service for money, money for service, but both have 
expectations of each other. As in any contractual relationship, things 
work best when the negotiations and the relationship benefit from 
transparency. The more secrets the two sides keep from each other, the 
more surprises — and conflict — will jar and poison the relationship in 
the future. My two key points are: (a) The social contract under which 
higher education operates is sufficiently complex that understanding 
how it performs will require a broadly inferential strategy; and (b) this 
strategy can probably begin by making far better use of existing data 
than is now made. 
The Social Contract in Perspective
Layer by layer, and product by product, higher education has gradu-
ally insinuated itself into the most fundamental matrix of the modern 
social order. It was once — and not so long ago — an exclusive agent 
of the elite. It kept far more people out than it let in, and it exalted 
and preserved the exclusive culture of America’s religious, ethnic, and 
moneyed classes. It may well have done as much damage as good 
(Freedman, 2000) although there is little question that many enlight-
ened leaders emerged from their college experiences.
Most colleges were historically private — in finance, in ownership, 
and in purpose. Although a few states had created public colleges 
as early as the late 1700s, and although the Northwest Ordinance 
and Morrill Acts represented federal commitments to the diffusion of 
knowledge and education, higher education in any meaningful sense 
awaited the emergence of public demand, and that demand could 
only emerge after public schooling through elementary and secondary 
levels became widespread.  
So it is only in very recent times, perhaps since the landmark 
“Truman” report of 1947, that anything like the predominantly public 
system of higher education we know in 2001 began to take shape. 
Notwithstanding the moral and political commitments of religious 
and social idealists who led the emerging institutions of the 19th 
century, it is difficult to imagine anything like the contemporary 
“social contract” in the minds of college and university educators of 
the centuries prior to 1947. 
But just what is this “contract?” And are the parties to it keeping 
their respective ends of the bargain? 
Higher education has taken on a wide array of sometimes con-
flicting missions in service to the nation. “Higher education” means 
everything from small, open-door, almost missionary, community 
colleges serving isolated rural areas to the great “multi-versities” (Kerr, 
1963) like Michigan, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and Berkeley that mix 
public and private funding; mix research, teaching, and service in 
extraordinarily complex organizational forms; and that resonate to 
norms of competitive excellence. Enormous, sprawling, multi-campus 
community colleges serve the nation’s major urban conglomerations 
(Miami-Dade, Houston) with massive immigrant and multilingual 
populations, while tiny liberal arts colleges preserve much of the 19th 
century ideal of classical education in self-contained quasi-monastic 
rural isolation (Earlham, St. Olaf, Williams). Progressive experiments 
that test assumptions and boundaries appear among both public and 
private colleges (Evergreen, Deep Springs). Walls between academe, 
business, and government have weakened in the face of impera-
tives to collaborate on research and development at the frontiers of 
knowledge. (MIT, Harvard).
Some now think of higher education as a profit-making enterprise, 
a consumer good available at cost on the open market. While much 
of what is assumed and known about higher education is presently 
based on the universe of “Title IV-eligible” institutions, education 
beyond the secondary level is increasingly available in other types of 
institutions from the nationally distributed University of Phoenix aimed 
at a non-traditional adult population to corporate training units that 
provide sophisticated graduate level courses to their own employees. 
The parameters and nature of these post-secondary opportunities are 
not well known. The role of the for-profit marketplace in modifying 
whatever social contract may justify tax support for higher educa-
tion is only just emerging, but it is consistent with the declining role 
of governments in a rapidly evolving global economy. (Yergin and 
Stanislaw, 1998)
Is the social contract something each of these profoundly dis-
similar institutions negotiated separately and individually with its 
own constituent communities and that may only be implicit in the 
characteristics of their students and alumni? Is it something that we 
can derive from government commitments to higher education — in 
the language of constitutions and laws that provide frameworks for 
purpose, governance, and funding? Is it traceable in the agreements 
colleges and universities reach with donors, foundations, business 
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corporations, “friends,” football fans and others who finance their 
activities? Does it emerge from public opinion and the will of the 
voters who delegate the power to govern to their representatives in 
state and national legislative bodies? Is it observable in the enrollment 
patterns and behaviors of students? In the work of faculty and staff? 
In the flow of money from varied sources to the many and varied 
activities of colleges and universities? In measurable outcomes of those 
patterns and activities?  
Perhaps it is only in the cumulative traces of all of these that a full 
picture of higher education’s bargain with society can be limned in 
all its dimensions. 
There is another side, though. Historically, higher education has 
stood apart from society, and even today its “institutional academic 
freedom” to teach, to research, to decide whom to admit, and how 
to conduct its internal affairs enjoys a measure of legal protection 
(Urofsky v. Gilmore, 2000). In ancient times, scholars banded together 
to search for truth in extra-territorial communities — free from civic 
authority, and sometimes in contravention of the most sacred cus-
toms of the day. It has been considered sui generis, but increasingly 
occupied by a corporate society anxious to impose control over its 
threatening independence (Goodman, 1964). Higher education once 
claimed a measure of autonomy because it historically stood in loco 
parentis, a trusted substitute for parental authority, in providing an 
environment where young people could grow and develop, spiritu-
ally, morally, and academically. Exercising this trust, it has relied on 
its mandate from the church, the state, and — more often today — its 
expertise in psychosocial development (still parental in many ways, 
but no longer legally “in loco…”). 
Of course, higher education has been called on to serve the nation. 
It served as an instrument of social and technological advancement as 
a result of the Morrill Act. It served as an instrument of the nation’s 
World War II effort and Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, 
generating basic scientific knowledge and technologically sophisticated 
weaponry, as well as training military personnel. It became an instru-
ment in the quest for civil and human rights in the latter decades of 
the 20th century, providing opportunities for minorities and women, 
and expanding knowledge and awareness of the nation’s checkered 
human rights history. Public funding expanded geometrically as these 
missions were layered atop (but never fully eclipsed) the time-worn 
commitment of higher education to preserve the status of elites and 
the corpus of classical knowledge.  
So the public has multiple and competing expectations of colleges 
and universities. Higher education holds a franchise that requires a 
certain measure of freedom and autonomy, but it also has accepted 
responsibilities that come with funding and the concomitant agree-
ment to serve a broader set of interests than its own internal sense 
of freedom and self-government.
Competing Missions
Two recent studies (Leslie & Fretwell, 1996; Goldman, Gates, & 
Brewer, 2001) have suggested reducing the multiple missions to rela-
tively simple, but competing, alternatives. Leslie and Fretwell suggest 
that teaching and serving undergraduate students is a fundamental core 
activity common to virtually all institutions, while other activities such 
as grant-supported research and entertainment-oriented auxiliaries are 
simply contractual agreements with private parties in which costs are 
recovered for the services rendered. The RAND study divides mission 
into “reputation-seeking” and “prestige-seeking” activities — essentially 
parallel to the Leslie/Fretwell categorization. “Reputation” involves 
effective servicing of the educational goals of a particular population. 
“Prestige” involves activities intended to put the institution at some 
perceived competitive advantage with others. 
Neither of these grapples with an entirely new question, nor in an 
entirely novel way. Howard Bowen’s notable “Investment in Learning” 
(1996) considered the conundrum posed by higher education’s dual 
service as a “private” and “public” good. Some of what it produces 
is of purely personal benefit to those who are willing to pay — and 
sometimes pay heavily — for it, but some of what it produces also 
deserves broad public investment on grounds that social capital results. 
Obviously, these are joint products to some unspecifiable   extent (cf. 
Hearn and Bunton, 2001), but the mix of public and private investment 
is both real and measurable. 
A slightly different and perhaps more generic formulation contrasts 
the imperatives and outcomes involved in both human and social 
capital formation (Cote, 2001). While “human capital” refers to the 
sum total of skills that individuals acquire and put to use in economic 
activities, “social capital” refers to the sum total of collective relations 
that enable trusting and cooperative activity. The two forms of capital 
underlie the productivity and stability (respectively) of modern, eco-
nomically advanced societies. In effect, “you can’t have one without 
the other” and expect a social order that both produces and cares at 
the same time. 
American society, built on successive waves of immigration, and 
reliant on some conscious means of bonding groups to the national 
consciousness as well as to each other, has relied on public education 
to produce both human capital and social capital — perhaps to a far 
greater extent than in more traditional societies. We have also — to a 
far greater extent than other societies — required individuals to invest 
their own personal funds in education. This mix of private and public 
funding confuses, rather than clarifies, the social contract issue. Are 
individuals contributing because they have a stake in the generation 
of social capital, in the advantage they gain by helping to create a 
good society? Or are they investing in their own personal human 
capital for the purpose of gaining competitive advantage over others? 
Is society investing in education as a way to avoid or reduce wasteful 
expenditures on policing, corrections, unnecessary health care, etc., 
and thus reducing the tax burdens on everyone? Or is society pro-
moting individual social mobility as a way of reducing subjective and 
objective deprivation and indirectly promoting collective civic order? 
Obviously, there is no easy way to disentangle these ideas. The 
functions are inseparable and the products are clearly “joint.” Most 
importantly, the social contract assumes that higher education is a 
player in the promotion of both human and social capital. 
Inference and Transparency in Assessing the Contract
The principal problems lie not so much in identifying elements 
of higher education’s mission, nor even in identifying the public’s 
expectations. How these mutual expectations are managed and how 
public accountability occurs are more central. What happens? What 
value is delivered and through what institutions? Who benefits? Who 
pays? Who decides? Who assesses? 
In our federal system, there is no one simple answer. Fifty states 
decide for themselves, and they have decided in their own ways, none 
clearly following templates of others. Michigan and California enshrine 
their public universities in their states’ constitutions, immunizing them 
to a considerable degree from legislative micro-management. Florida, 
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on the other hand, has recently seen its public university system 
completely reorganized at what appeared to be legislative whim. Pri-
vate higher education predominates in Massachusetts, while there is 
essentially no competitive private higher education in New Mexico. 
Some states place heavy tuition burdens on their students (Vermont, 
for example), while others (North Carolina, for example) pride them-
selves on a long-standing policy of low tuition and broad access. 
Inferring anything about a “social contract” clearly must be just 
that— an inference. Inference is a logical process of accumulating 
evidence, observing patterns, testing these patterns for consistency 
or inconsistency, continuity or discontinuity, independence or contin-
gency, and simplicity or complexity. More and better information leads 
to progressively greater transparency, understanding, and mutuality 
in sustaining any contractual relationship. So I suggest that we begin 
with an assessment of what data and information are available, and 
how they might help understand and interpret the status of higher 
education’s relationship with its supporters. 
Both federal and state agencies now collect a considerable amount of 
raw data on higher education, principally Title IV eligible higher educa-
tion, but the data are not necessarily standardized from one agency 
to another, nor is collection coordinated in any meaningful way. On 
the whole, I think an inferential strategy will best stand the test of 
time — leading us to progressively clearer pictures of what goes on in 
higher education, how it is organized, and what value emerges. How 
best to draw these successively clearer pictures is an art and a science 
that has yet to be designed purposefully. I suggest the following ideas 
as starting points for discussion.
1. Build on (but coordinate) existing streams of data. NCES 
and SHEEO agencies, along with NPEC, comprise a base, but a wide 
variety of others, such as the College Board, the institutional associa-
tions like NASULGC, AAU, AASCU, NAICU, AACC, etc., all engage 
in the generation and analysis of information. RAND, Brookings, the 
Institute for Higher Education Policy, the new National Center for 
Public Policy and Higher Education, and others have produced useful 
analytical work in recent years. Similarly, NSF, the Census Bureau, the 
U.S. Labor Department, and other agencies of the federal government 
collect data that could be useful. NPEC is arguably the closest thing 
to a “coordinating” body in this confusing and overlapping array of 
data sources. It is still relatively new, though, and is still seeking to 
establish its own identity, organizational form, and role. On the whole, 
a strategic assessment of the current sources, characteristics, quality, 
and currency of data is needed.
2. Standardize periodicity. The U.S. Census is conducted every 
ten years. Other surveys of economic activity, social indicators, and 
health are conducted regularly and on established schedules. Turn-
around in publishing these data is usually relatively fast, especially with 
the emergence of electronic data processing and Internet-based releases. 
Postsecondary surveys (e.g., IPEDS) go through lengthy “cleaning” 
processes and may be years in preparation before release. Likewise, 
data collected by states vary in the frequency and refinement with 
which they are collected, and data that are maintained by proprietary 
sources may not be released at all. At the very least, some efficient 
means of providing the public a continuous and timely picture, if only 
a snapshot, of higher education’s current status ought to be designed. 
Annual “best buy” issues of commercial surveys or “five-year plans” 
of state coordinating bodies are: (a) too little; and (b) too late. The 
NCPPHE “Report Card” is both a good example of good intentions 
and a warning about the complexities and difficulties such a project 
might ultimately encounter. 
3. Monitor trends. Higher education and the public policy 
commitments that have shaped the system as it exists today are 
the product of both incremental and revolutionary developments. 
The federal initiatives that have brought us mass student financial 
aid introduced new ideas and sources of funding (and enrollment) 
representing revolutionary change. States have recently implemented 
another revolution in financial aid, HOPE scholarships. Yet, each 
of these revolutionary developments has been continuously, and 
profoundly, reshaped by incremental changes that take place from year 
to year. What started out, for example, as a source of grant funding 
to poor students under federal law has been reshaped and reshaped 
into what is now essentially a system of mass loans and tax incentives 
that benefit middle class students. Likewise, states have progressively 
increased tuition at public universities and colleges at rates (in some 
cases dramatically) that exceed the rate of increase in state appropria-
tions for the support of those same institutions. These fundamental 
changes in public policy are really only visible in retrospective analyses 
of trends, and those trends are only visible to the extent that continu-
ous data collection and publication provide the dots that researchers 
can connect. The Grapevine project, begun over 40 years ago by M. 
M. Chambers and supported subsequently by Illinois State University 
and other funding sources, is an example of such a continuous annual 
data collection effort.
4. Engage in policy monitoring and evaluation. When the 
NCPPHE finally issued its laboriously constructed “report card,” it 
acknowledged that data on outcomes were almost wholly lacking. 
One side of this argument has it that the strength of American higher 
education lies in the independence of all institutions. They survive 
in a highly competitive marketplace for their products; so “they must 
be doing what the public wants.” The other side of the argument 
has it that colleges and universities are self-indulgent and hypocritical 
havens of unaccountable, unproductive radicals who not only do 
no real work, but poison the minds of impressionable youth. Who 
wins? Obviously it all depends… It all depends on who can show that 
colleges and universities are or are not producing something of value.
Many states, most famously Tennessee and South Carolina, have 
experimented with one version or another of “performance funding.” 
On whatever the specific terms, institutions are asked to generate and 
submit data on their activities and outcomes that would show (a) the 
extent to which particular goals have (or have not) been achieved; 
and (b) the degree of efficiency with which institutions have oper-
ated. While no two performance funding schemes are alike, they 
have at least provided incentives for institutions to begin operating 
“accountably.” Accrediting bodies such as SACS are now beginning to 
focus on a similar process. Institutions may be asked to rationalize the 
way they plan and evaluate their activities, instead of showing only 
that they operate in conventional and responsible ways. 
Whether good or bad (and opinion certainly varies), these fairly 
recent developments suggest a widespread interest in evaluating the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of higher education. Any prospective research 
effort that speaks to the “social contract” would have to account for 
the assumptions, methodologies, results, and impact of these efforts. 
It might well begin with an assessment of assessment — that is, what 
can be learned from the experiences of states,accrediting bodies, and 
institutions with this recent wave of attention to performance and 
accountability.  
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5. Complexify. In a massive and complex industry like higher 
education, with many “producers,” a wide array of consumers, huge 
variations in price and quality, plural sources of funding and control, 
it is probably irresponsible to strive for any kind of simple — not to 
say simplistic — portrait. A fundamentally inferential approach may 
well lead to the conclusion that multiple social contracts with multiple 
constituencies and clienteles require complex analyses rather than 
simple ones. Pat Callan’s various works show the power of case stud-
ies in understanding the extraordinarily multivariate state of things in 
higher education. Increasingly, the use of multiple regression and related 
statistical methods suggest that the answer to most questions should 
begin with “it all depends.” Policies and practices can both under-
shoot and overshoot their intended targets. Unintended consequences 
emerge, often only in remote hindsight. My own studies of full- and 
part-time faculty using NSOPF data clearly confirm the importance 
of disaggregating nearly everything by (a) type of institution; and (b) 
teaching field or discipline. 
Inputs differ. Some institutions are rich; some are poor. Processes 
differ. Some institutions are complex (Illinois); some are simple 
(Tusculum). Outcomes differ. Some institutions avow a commitment 
to moral outcomes (Wheaton, IL), others to intellectual outcomes 
(Chicago). Some exalt contemporary ideas (Santa Cruz); others vener-
ate the past (St. John’s). 
Making transparent what colleges and universities do, with what 
resources and technologies, with what effects or outcomes will 
probably lead to a progressively more complicated picture of the 
social contracts we try to fulfill. If we can find a way to disaggregate 
first and simplify second, perhaps the complexity of the picture will 
be easier to absorb and understand — by both researchers and the 
attentive publics to whom we speak.
Conclusion
It seems to me that the challenge is to organize the research 
community in a way that builds a strategic, continuous, cumulative, 
and multivariable process from which the public might be able to infer 
whether the terms of these social contracts are being met. A social 
contract is built on trust, and trust is perhaps best established through 
an open and honest exchange of good information. Because higher 
education and society are partly bound tightly to one another and 
because their mutual interests are also well-served when a measure 
of autonomy and independence allow higher education appropriate 
freedoms, the extent to which they can and should inform each other 
is necessarily fluid and negotiable. 
However, “fluid and negotiable” does not mean chaotic and 
unaccountable. Too often, a close look at how we now collect, 
organize, interpret, and report data appears both chaotic and lacking 
in concrete meaning. I would challenge us to think strategically about 
how we might best organize to use our already considerable capabilities 
to gather data and infer. Building on the vast array of existing data, 
but bringing it together in more timely and sharper focus, seems to 
me to be the most important starting point. We’ll know more about 
whether the social contract is in good shape once we know more 
about what we do, how we do it, and whether we are producing value 
for the support we receive. 
In the end, the freest (and, paradoxically, the most orderly) markets 
are essentially based on transparency. Everyone has full informa-
tion about what they get for what they pay. Mutual understanding 
probably ought to be the goal in sustaining any contract, private, 
public, or social. Until we know better what is expected of us, and 
until the public knows better what they are getting, and until it is 
clear who pays how much and what that money buys, we had best 
struggle seriously with transparency — conceptually, technically, and 
with a sense of its centrality to the public’s interest in higher education.
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